

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
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ER 3487X 87

PAO 0164 87

ER 3487/1 87

PAO 0106- 88

PAO 0350 88

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PAO 0363 88

PAO 0379 88

ER 4233X 88

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WORLD
SUBJECT: AFFAIRS COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Thank You Letter from the World Affairs Council of WDC

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

ER 88-4233X/1

DATE

17 November 1988

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Bill Baker

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- all the attention
& detail helps!

Good job

5 to 6 Subs.

I wanted you to see
thatefforts on your
behalf are appreciated.DCI
EXEC
REG

P-309.1R



WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
1800 M Street, N.W. • 3rd Floor • Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 293-1051

November 11, 1988

STAT

[Redacted]
Public Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

STAT

Dear [Redacted]

On behalf of the members of the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C., I would like to thank you for your many hours of assistance on our behalf in arranging for Judge Webster's address to the Council on October 25.

I am so pleased that you were able to attend and witness what a successful event it was. His appearance attracted the largest audience by far that we have had for a single speaker, and we have not had that wide an interest on the part of the major networks since Secretary of State Muskie gave his farewell address in 1981.

Thank you for keeping us informed during the many months that we waited to have an opening on his calendar and for all the details that you covered in assuring that the event went smoothly. It was a pleasure to work with you, and of course, we would be delighted to have such an opportunity at any time in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Julie
Julie Chitwood
Executive Director

2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1

~~EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT~~

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

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Remarks

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ER 88-4233X

Executive Secretary

15 Nov '88

Date

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WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
1800 M Street, N.W. • 3rd Floor • Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 293-1051

November 11, 1988

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

I would like to express our sincere appreciation to you for your appearance on October 25 before the members of The World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. It was an honor to host your address, and our members were delighted to have the opportunity to hear your views and your responses to their questions.


Your appearance attracted the largest audience we have had in 1988, and we received many favorable comments from our members about your presentation. I hope you found the evening as successful as we did.

Enclosed is a photograph to commemorate the occasion, and we hope that you will consider our platform one that remains open to you.

It was a personal pleasure to meet with you, and I wish you much success in your responsibilities.

Sincerely yours,

Philip A. Odeen
Chairman



ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Transcript of Your Remarks at the World Affairs Council
of Washington, D.C. on October 25

FROM:

William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs

EXTENSION

27676

NO.

PAO 88-0379

DATE

4 November 1988

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

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4 November 1988

JUDGE:


I have attached a copy of the final transcript of your remarks at the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. on October 25. Unfortunately, you saw an earlier draft of this transcript before it was ready for review. I understand that the draft was delivered to you rather than to my office at Headquarters, which had need of a "first cut" transcript to respond to the press. The final transcript, intended as the record copy, incorporates the changes that you made to the proposed remarks.




STAT



Bill Baker

Attachment:
As stated

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P-309-IR

REMARKS

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AT THE

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OCTOBER 25, 1988

Intelligence collection may be in the eye of the beholder. About two months ago then KGB Director Chebrikov made one of his rare, perhaps even one of his first, appearances to talk about intelligence. And he quoted a speech that I made last year -- or at least a press interview, I think with The Los Angeles Times -- in which I was asked whether, following the problem with our Moscow Embassy, it was still possible to collect inside the Soviet Union. And I had said yes, that we were indeed able to recruit assets who would supply needed intelligence for that purpose. And then Chebrikov said that nothing could be plainer -- this makes the point for why the Soviet Union should spend more money on counterintelligence. I suppose you've heard us make the same argument in this country. A few days ago, the chief of the KGB in Leningrad made a similar statement.

It brings to mind one of the stories collected for the President as part of his perestroika collection. This story was about Gorbachev's desire to find out how his program of perestroika was working in the outer areas. Gorbachev sent a representative out into the Ukraine to visit some of the smaller villages. The representative went to the mayor of one of the villages and, after talking to the mayor for a moment, he said, "Do you have any television sets in this village?" The mayor looked at him and said, "Of course we have television sets. In fact, there may be two television sets in many of these huts." The representative said, "That is very interesting. What about refrigerators?" And the mayor said, "Of course. We all have refrigerators." The representative looked the mayor in the eye and said, "Do you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who else but a CIA

agent would come into a village with no electricity and ask questions like that?"

Well, Carlucci, Crowe, Shultz and others are going around having bilaterals, but I have to tell you we have no planned bilaterals with the KGB.

It is the fall of 1988. We edge toward the end of the year and the end of the decade. I have been asked rather frequently in recent months to reflect on what the most important intelligence issues of the 1990s will be. The question reminds me of an observation once made by a nuclear physicist who said, "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." With that cautionary note in mind, I will make a few predictions about some of the key issues that now confront the Intelligence Community -- issues that we expect to be with us well into the next decade.

My good friend, General Vernon Walters, who was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and is now our Ambassador to the United Nations, describes a view held by many in this country about intelligence. "Americans," he said, "have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."

With so much going on around the world that affects our national security, I think the American people today want a lot of intelligence. And a whole range of issues are commanding the Intelligence Community's attention -- international terrorism and drug trafficking, the proliferation of advanced weapons, the transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Bloc -- to name just a few intelligence issues that are global in nature.

Our interests around the world as a free superpower require our awareness of happenings, plans, capabilities, and intentions in many regions of the world where insurgencies, war, and political change are going on -- such as in the many different countries in Latin American and in Africa, the problems in the Middle East, the struggle in Cambodia, to name just a few.

This evening, I want to concentrate on three geographical areas that are -- and will continue to be -- of great interest to U.S. policymakers and, thus, to the Intelligence Community. These areas are the Soviet Union, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

The nations of these three areas have many common borders. Their interests are, necessarily, interrelated. Yet it is really a region without boundaries, for the force of developments there is felt far beyond Moscow, or Islamabad, or Tehran. Gorbachev's plans for reform, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict -- one of the bloodiest wars of our time and one that breached the international restraint against the use of chemical weapons -- have an impact far beyond the immediate region. All these events have major implications not only for regional peace and stability, but for the interests of the United States and the West and, indeed, for the entire world.

The Soviet Union will remain the primary focus of our intelligence collection and analysis in the 1990s. Its military capability, its efforts to increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities continue to pose security challenges to United States interests.

Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered these truths and, in fact, make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to U.S. intelligence.

Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew -- bringing new life and dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us could have foreseen even five years ago.

The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads. Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we know it, today's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering largely because it has not given the people enough breathing room -- room to innovate, room to inquire, room to unlock creativity.

Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. For example, the Soviets are leaving Afghanistan and they are eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons under the INF treaty -- a process that includes unprecedented on-site inspections of Soviet military facilities.

The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle is under way between reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the Communist system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could destabilize the very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this struggle will affect how far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to which central authority is relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and how competitive the Soviet system will be over the next few decades.

Just a few weeks ago, Gorbachev successfully challenged a number of individuals in the Soviet hierarchy -- undertaking the most sweeping overhaul of the top party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in 1957. The changes made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy agenda at home and abroad with renewed momentum.

Yet this is only one victory in a very long-term undertaking to reform the Soviet system. The process will be long and drawn out at best, requiring Gorbachev to overcome enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles.

There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and concentrate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become more decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of its people. The nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other regions of the USSR will further test the Soviet system's ability to make reforms work.

But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that Gorbachev is a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the possibility that he can, ultimately, pull off a "revolution from above" that actually increases authority below.

The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with some very formidable challenges. We must pay closer attention than ever to the political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev continues to challenge the established interests of individuals and institutions.

We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet military and economic capabilities and -- perhaps even more difficult -- how it may change Moscow's foreign policy.

In the Intelligence Community, we must manage the information explosion that glasnost has produced which, though welcome, challenges us to sort out what is important and what is not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to hear.

We must support U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. As these negotiations progress, the Intelligence Community will be increasingly asked to assess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of agreements. And the amount of support required is tremendous. The INF treaty has required the United States to conduct inspections at 117 Soviet facilities. Monitoring the START treaty, which is now being negotiated in Geneva, could involve as many as 2,500 weapons locations spread throughout the Soviet Union.

Yet whatever arms control agreements the United States makes with the Soviet Union, our relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers will depend on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments -- and even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected initiatives, such as the proposal that he made recently to give up Cam Ranh Bay if we would give up the Philippines, or to withdraw troops from Hungary if we would give up our fighters based in Italy.

Moving south, intelligence about South Asia will continue to be important to policymakers for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Soviet influence in the region. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from

Afghanistan demonstrates his desire to cut Soviet losses in order to pursue other objectives. But despite the Soviet troop withdrawal, Afghanistan is going to remain a key foreign policy concern in Moscow. Because of the Soviets' continued interest and its strategic location, Afghanistan will remain an important concern in Washington as well.

I recall a meeting with President Zia this time last year. He went to his library shelf and pulled off a book showing a map of the region over which he had put a red celluloid overlay to illustrate Soviet influence in Afghanistan and show the strategic wedge that further occupation of that territory represented not only to Iran, but to Pakistan and nations further south.

We expect the Soviets to abide by their commitment to withdraw the rest of their troops from Afghanistan by February 15th of next year. That has not changed, despite the Soviets' pause in their withdrawal. At the same time, Moscow will try to retain its influence with Kabul through both economic and political means. The appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan just a few weeks ago indicates that Afghanistan remains a priority concern in Moscow.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, we believe that Afghanistan will be unstable for a considerable period and have so advised policymakers. The Soviet-backed regime has minimal control or support outside Kabul, and the withdrawal will make its position even more precarious. The Afghan resistance will continue its effort to destroy what is left of the regime. However, the ruling party's fragmentation may be as large a factor in the regime's collapse

as the military initiatives of the resistance. We believe that the military could probably last for a longer period of time than we have predicted for the political structure itself.

The post-Soviet period will also find the Afghan rebels fighting among themselves. That has been historically so. They did it throughout the Soviet occupation and we expect that it will continue. Given that most ethnic groups are better armed than ever before and are likely to capture additional weapons from the disintegrating Afghan army, we could expect to see tribal conflict continue for some time after the Soviet withdrawal.

The fundamentalist groups of the Afghan resistance will enter the post-Soviet era well-armed and well-organized. Whatever the composition of a future government in Afghanistan, Islamic ritual and law will probably play a larger role in its operations and its policies. But the nature and traditions of Afghanistan make the imposition of a Khomeini-style fundamentalism unlikely.

I think it's important to say that the United States cannot dictate who will finally emerge as the leaders in Afghanistan. A strong central government is unlikely, and residual hostility to the Soviets may eventually be matched by the return of historical suspicions about the West. Perhaps the good news about events in Afghanistan is not so much what has been gained, but what has been averted.

Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal and the struggle for political control are the primary intelligence issues in Afghanistan for the near term. But efforts by neighboring countries to exert influence there will also receive our attention. In the longer term, we will examine the future Afghan government's

attempts to rebuild the country and resettle the world's largest refugee population -- more than five million people.

About three million of those refugees now live in Pakistan, a country that has fully supported the Afghan resistance. Pakistan has always been of strategic interest to the United States and to its policymakers, but the death of President Zia in August has raised new issues.

The response to President Zia's death has been a smooth, constitutional transition. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the Senate, has taken over as Acting President. Under the Constitution, a new president must be elected within 30 days after Parliamentary elections. President Ishaq has announced that elections set for November 16th will be held on schedule. A series of judicial rulings have removed the constraints placed on Pakistan's political parties in the 1985 elections, and the November elections have become the most closely contested in Pakistan's history.

I think I should also add that the military has supported this effort to fill the vacancies through constitutional means. I think there is real support for this process. Pakistan is plagued by problems of terrorism, partly as a result of its role in support of the Afghan resistance. But I do not think, as long as the terrorism is under control, that this will change the military's willingness to let voters decide the issue.

Because of the close relationship between the United States and Pakistan and because of Pakistan's strategic importance, the U.S. Intelligence Community will be following these developments with the keenest interest.

Further south is another region of great strategic interest for the United States -- the Persian Gulf -- an area where tensions remain high despite the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the peace talks between the two nations have been fitful and difficult. The animosities built up over eight years of bitter conflict are not easy to dispel.

The Iran-Iraq war cost the two countries more than \$350 billion, and even more in human costs -- more than one million casualties and one and a half million refugees. This was one of the bloodiest wars of the century, and it will take many years for the two nations to recover.

The conflict has affected nearly every aspect of economic life in Iran and Iraq. Both economies have been weakened by the loss of oil revenues and both have borne the expense of large-scale arms purchases. Both countries have exhausted their financial reserves and have been compelled to cut economic development programs.

We believe these costs of the war will deter both sides from resuming an all-out conflict anytime soon. However, Iran and Iraq continue to distrust each other, and both will probably maintain their military readiness.

The U.S. Intelligence Community has closely followed the Iran-Iraq conflict, providing assessments of the intentions and capabilities of both sides, as well as the implications for the region and the United States. When the U.S. presence in the Gulf was increased, we began providing daily tactical intelligence support to naval forces operating with the U.S. Central Command. Our support included reports on Iranian antiship cruise missile sites, naval bases, airfields, and coastal defense installations. As a result, U.S. forces

have been better able to successfully carry out U.S. foreign policy and protect our security interests.

The end of the Gulf war has created a whole new set of intelligence questions which we are now addressing -- questions such as what effect the cease-fire may have on the Western hostages being held in Lebanon; how the political struggle in Tehran to succeed Khomeini will be affected; what impact the cease-fire will have on each country's drive for regional influence; and the long-term impact of these developments on the cost of oil.

Perhaps the biggest question we are considering is what lessons Iran and Iraq -- and the rest of the world -- have learned from a war that involved the first sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.

After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II -- even during the most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using chemical weapons -- weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."

The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for future wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too, has employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.

I'm sure you've read many accounts recently about the use of and the effects of chemical weapons. These weapons are thought to offer a cheap and readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more powerful foes. Some see them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and more than 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons.

Mustard gas, which is a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one of the favored chemical agents for several reasons -- its relative ease of manufacture, its long life in storage and on the battlefield, and its ability to incapacitate those who are exposed to it.

Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain and nervous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as cyanide and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while phosgene, widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs.

Most of these plants look like nothing more than pesticide plants and are difficult to detect.

The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor the ability of foreign countries to develop and produce chemical weapons, and their incentives for using such weapons. And with the increase of ballistic missiles in the Third World, we must be alert to attempts by Third World nations to arm these missiles with chemical warheads. Virtually every city in the Middle East would be subject to such an attack, if these two types of weapons are combined.

The proliferation of advanced weapons affects the prospects for peace and stability in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. For Israel, the spread of chemical weapons among the Arab states -- principally Iraq, Libya, and Syria -- could seriously alter the regional balance of power. This has major implications for peace in the Middle East.

It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been lifted. At least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons, and this presents us with another intelligence concern.

Intelligence support is also vital to the success of United States efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons -- efforts such as restricting the export of certain key chemicals and of ballistic missile technology. On the international front, the United States participates in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which is trying to negotiate a chemical weapons ban. And on September 26th, President Reagan addressed the United Nations General Assembly. He called on the signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other concerned nations to convene a conference to consider actions that we can take together to reverse the serious erosion of this treaty.

Yes, assessing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is one of the most difficult challenges we face in the Intelligence Community -- now and into the next decade. It is also one of our most important tasks, for these weapons may well represent one of the most serious threats to world peace in the coming years.

The famed British writer and cynic, Somerset Maugham, once noted, "It is bad enough to know the past; it would be intolerable to know the future." It would, of course, be just as intolerable not to be prepared for the future. The intelligence issues that I have chosen for discussion today -- reform in the Soviet Union, unrest in Afghanistan, and tensions in the Persian Gulf -- are issues that will be with us into the next decade. Assessing these questions and their far-reaching effects is the critical task of intelligence.

Our machines, our systems, and our satellites are the wonders of the age. They help us to do our very difficult work. But intelligence is preeminently an affair of people. It is the caliber of the men and women of American intelligence -- their creativity, determination, brilliance, and courage -- that spells the difference between success and failure.

And I hope very much that we continue to attract those best suited to carry out our mission -- people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are dedicated and responsive to our law and discipline. People who understand and play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not a necessary part of their life, but who can find in this difficult work an avenue to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.

With such people, we can continue to provide the intelligence that policymakers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our national security. This is what you expect of us, what all Americans expect of us, and I can assure you we are doing our very best to supply it.

25X1

PAO 88-0363

~~SECRET~~

25 October 1988

JUDGE:

Attached is a revised draft of your remarks to the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. this evening. We have incorporated your comments on the interrelated interests of the Soviet Union and the nations of South Asia and the Persian Gulf, as well as the far-reaching impact of developments in this broad region. We have also removed the brief section on counterintelligence.

Bill Baker

Attachments:
As stated

Regrade as UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from attachments.



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~~SECRET~~

P-309-TR

PROPOSED REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1988

IT IS THE FALL OF 1988 -- WE EDGE TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR AND THE END OF THE DECADE. I HAVE BEEN ASKED RATHER FREQUENTLY IN RECENT MONTHS TO REFLECT ON WHAT THE MOST IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE ISSUES OF THE 1990s WILL BE. THE QUESTION REMINDS ME OF AN OBSERVATION ONCE MADE BY A NUCLEAR PHYSICIST: "PREDICTION IS VERY DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE."¹ WITH THAT CAUTIONARY NOTE IN MIND, I WILL MAKE A FEW PREDICTIONS ABOUT SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES THAT NOW CONFRONT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- ISSUES THAT WE EXPECT TO BE WITH US WELL INTO THE NEXT DECADE.

MY GOOD FRIEND, GENERAL VERNON WALTERS, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NOW OUR AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DESCRIBES A VIEW HELD BY MANY IN THIS COUNTRY ABOUT INTELLIGENCE. "AMERICANS," HE SAID, "HAVE ALWAYS HAD AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THEY FEEL

THREATENED, THEY WANT A LOT OF IT, AND WHEN THEY DON'T, THEY TEND TO REGARD THE WHOLE THING AS SOMEWHAT IMMORAL."

WITH SO MUCH GOING ON AROUND THE WORLD THAT AFFECTS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TODAY WANT A LOT OF INTELLIGENCE. AND A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES ARE COMMANDING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ATTENTION -- INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING, THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS, THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET BLOC-- TO NAME JUST A FEW INTELLIGENCE ISSUES THAT ARE GLOBAL IN NATURE.

THIS EVENING, I WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THREE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS THAT ARE -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- OF GREAT INTEREST TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND, THUS, OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THESE AREAS ARE THE SOVIET UNION, SOUTH ASIA, AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE NATIONS OF THIS BROAD REGION BORDER EACH OTHER AND THEIR INTERESTS ARE, NECESSARILY, INTERRELATED. YET IT IS

REALLY A REGION WITHOUT BOUNDARIES. FOR THE FORCE OF DEVELOPMENTS THERE IS FELT FAR BEYOND MOSCOW, OR ISLAMABAD, OR TEHRAN. GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR REFORM, THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN, AND THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT -- ONE OF THE BLOODIEST WARS OF OUR TIME AND ONE THAT BREACHED THE INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINT AGAINST THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- HAVE AN IMPACT FAR BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE REGION. ALL THESE EVENTS HAVE MAJOR IMPLICATIONS NOT ONLY FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY, BUT FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST AND, INDEED, FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD.

THE SOVIET UNION WILL REMAIN THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS IN THE 1990s. ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY, ITS EFFORTS TO INCREASE GLOBAL INFLUENCE, AND ITS AGGRESSIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE A SERIOUS THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS.²

GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS TO REFORM HIS COUNTRY HAVE NOT FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THESE TRUTHS AND, IN FACT, MAKE THE SOVIET UNION OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE.

THE PRESIDENT TOLD ME AN INTERESTING STORY RECENTLY.

GORBACHEV SENT A REPRESENTATIVE OUT INTO ONE OF THE UKRAINIAN STATES TO SEE HOW PERESTROIKA WAS GETTING ALONG. HE WENT TO ONE OF THE SMALL VILLAGES AND ASKED TO SEE THE MAYOR. AFTER TALKING TO THE MAYOR FOR A MOMENT, HE SAID, "DO YOU HAVE ANY TELEVISION SETS IN THIS VILLAGE?" THE MAYOR LOOKED AT HIM AND SAID, "OF COURSE WE HAVE TELEVISION SETS. IN FACT, THERE MAY BE TWO TELEVISION SETS IN MANY OF THESE HUTS." THE REPRESENTATIVE SAID, "THAT IS VERY INTERESTING. WHAT ABOUT REFRIGERATORS?" AND THE MAYOR SAID, "OF COURSE. WE ALL HAVE REFRIGERATORS." THE REPRESENTATIVE LOOKED THE MAYOR IN THE EYE AND SAID, "DO YOU KNOW WHO I AM?" AND THE MAYOR SAID, "OF COURSE I DO. WHO ELSE BUT A CIA AGENT WOULD COME INTO A VILLAGE WITH NO ELECTRICITY AND ASK QUESTIONS LIKE THAT?"

LIKE MANY OF YOU, I HAVE BEEN FASCINATED BY WHAT IS OCCURRING IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV HAS STIRRED UP THE STEW -- BRINGING NEW LIFE AND DYNAMISM TO SOVIET POLITICS AND

PUSHING A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT NONE OF US COULD HAVE FORESEEN FIVE YEARS AGO.

THE FORCES OF DEMOCRACY ARE MAKING SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INROADS. ALTHOUGH THE USSR CERTAINLY IS NOT HEADED TOWARD DEMOCRACY AS WE KNOW IT, TODAY'S SOVIET LEADERS APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR SYSTEM IS FALTERING LARGELY BECAUSE IT HAS NOT GIVEN THE PEOPLE ENOUGH BREATHING ROOM -- ROOM TO INNOVATE, ROOM TO INQUIRE, ROOM TO INVESTIGATE.

CHANGE IS OCCURRING IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL. THE SOVIETS ARE LEAVING AFGHANISTAN AND ELIMINATING A WHOLE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE INF TREATY -- A PROCESS THAT INCLUDES UNPRECEDENTED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY FACILITIES.

THE DRAMATIC NATURE OF THESE POLICY CHANGES CLEARLY HAS PROVOKED CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. A MAJOR POWER STRUGGLE IS UNDER WAY BETWEEN REFORMERS, WHO BELIEVE RADICAL CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM WORK, AND

CONSERVATIVES, WHO FEAR SUCH CHANGES COULD DESTABILIZE THE VERY SYSTEM THEY ARE TRYING TO SAVE. THE OUTCOME OF THIS STRUGGLE WILL AFFECT HOW FAR AND HOW FAST REFORM PROGRESSES, THE EXTENT TO WHICH CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS RELAXED, THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE INDIVIDUAL, AND HOW COMPETITIVE THE SOVIET SYSTEM WILL BE OVER THE NEXT FEW DECADES.

JUST ABOUT A MONTH AGO, GORBACHEV SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY -- UNDERTAKING THE MOST SWEEPING OVERHAUL OF THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIP SINCE KHRUSHCHEV OUSTED HIS CHIEF OPPONENTS IN 1957.³ THE CHANGES MADE SHOULD ALLOW GORBACHEV TO PUSH HIS POLICY AGENDA AT HOME AND ABROAD WITH RENEWED MOMENTUM.⁴

YET THIS IS ONLY ONE VICTORY IN A VERY LONG WAR TO REFORM THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THE PROCESS WILL BE LONG AND DRAWN OUT AT BEST, REQUIRING GORBACHEV TO OVERCOME ENORMOUS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES.

THERE ARE STRONG REASONS TO DOUBT WHETHER A SYSTEM DESIGNED TO CENTRALIZE AUTHORITY, MAXIMIZE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER ITS PEOPLE, AND CONCENTRATE RESOURCES ON BUILDING UP THE NATION'S MILITARY STRENGTH CAN BECOME MORE DECENTRALIZED AND DEMOCRATIC IN ITS DECISIONMAKING AND MORE SOLICITOUS OF ITS PEOPLE. THE NATIONALIST UNREST IN THE BALTIC STATES, ARMENIA, AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE USSR WILL TEST THE SOVIET SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO MAKE REFORMS WORK.

BUT IF THE LAST THREE YEARS HAVE TAUGHT US ANYTHING, IT IS THAT GORBACHEV IS A HIGHLY SKILLED POLITICIAN, AND WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE CAN, ULTIMATELY, PULL OFF A "REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE" THAT ACTUALLY INCREASES AUTHORITY BELOW.

THE SOVIET REFORM EFFORT PRESENTS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH SOME FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES. WE MUST PAY CLOSER ATTENTION THAN EVER TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND ISSUES BEING RAISED AS GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE THE ESTABLISHED INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS.

WE MUST ALSO HELP THE POLICYMAKER SORT OUT HOW REFORM WILL AFFECT SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES AND -- EVEN MORE DIFFICULT -- HOW IT MAY CHANGE MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY.

WE MUST MANAGE THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION THAT GLASNOST HAS PRODUCED WHICH, THOUGH WELCOME, CHALLENGES US TO SORT OUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT AND WHAT IS NOT, WHAT IS REAL VERSUS WHAT MOSCOW WANTS US TO HEAR.

WE MUST SUPPORT U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS. AS THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE INCREASINGLY ASKED TO ASSESS SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS. AND THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT REQUIRED IS TREMENDOUS. THE INF TREATY HAS REQUIRED THE UNITED STATES TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS AT 117 SOVIET FACILITIES. MONITORING THE START TREATY, WHICH IS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA, COULD INVOLVE AS MANY AS 2,500 WEAPONS LOCATIONS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION.⁵

YET WHATEVER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THE UNITED STATES MAKES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OUR RELATIONSHIP IS LIKELY TO REMAIN ADVERSARIAL. POLICYMAKERS WILL DEPEND ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO MAKE QUICK AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS -- AND EVEN TO ANTICIPATE GORBACHEV'S SOMETIMES UNORTHODOX AND UNEXPECTED INITIATIVES.

INTELLIGENCE ABOUT SOUTH ASIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT TO POLICYMAKERS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN DEMONSTRATES HIS DESIRE TO CUT SOVIET LOSSES IN ORDER TO PURSUE OTHER OBJECTIVES. BUT DESPITE THE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN A KEY FOREIGN POLICY CONCERN IN MOSCOW. BECAUSE OF THE SOVIETS' CONTINUED INTEREST AND ITS STRATEGIC LOCATION, AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN AN IMPORTANT CONCERN IN WASHINGTON AS WELL.⁶

WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW THE REST OF THEIR TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN BY FEBRUARY

15TH OF NEXT YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW WILL TRY TO RETAIN ITS INFLUENCE WITH KABUL THROUGH BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEANS. THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN SEVERAL WEEKS AGO INDICATES THAT AFGHANISTAN REMAINS A PRIORITY CONCERN IN MOSCOW.

FOLLOWING THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, WE BELIEVE THAT AFGHANISTAN WILL BE UNSTABLE FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD AND HAVE SO ADVISED POLICYMAKERS. THE SOVIET-BACKED REGIME HAS MINIMAL CONTROL OR SUPPORT OUTSIDE KABUL, AND THE WITHDRAWAL WILL MAKE ITS POSITION EVEN MORE PRECARIOUS. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO DESTROY WHAT IS LEFT OF THE REGIME. HOWEVER, THE RULING PARTY'S FRAGMENTATION MAY BE AS LARGE A FACTOR IN THE REGIME'S COLLAPSE AS THE MILITARY INITIATIVES OF THE RESISTANCE.

THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD WILL ALSO FIND THE AFGHAN REBELS FIGHTING AMONG THEMSELVES -- AS THEY DID THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET OCCUPATION -- FOR POLITICAL POWER IN AFGHANISTAN. GIVEN THAT

MOST ETHNIC GROUPS ARE BETTER ARMED THAN EVER BEFORE AND ARE LIKELY TO CAPTURE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS FROM THE DISINTEGRATING AFGHAN ARMY. WE COULD EXPECT TO SEE TRIBAL CONFLICT CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

THE FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL ENTER THE POST-SOVIET ERA WELL-ARMED AND WELL-ORGANIZED. WHATEVER THE COMPOSITION OF A FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, ISLAMIC RITUAL AND LAW WILL PROBABLY PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN ITS OPERATIONS AND POLICIES. BUT THE NATURE AND TRADITIONS OF AFGHANISTAN MAKE THE IMPOSITION OF A KHOMEINI-STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM UNLIKELY.

THE UNITED STATES CANNOT DICTATE WHO WILL FINALLY EMERGE AS THE LEADERS IN AFGHANISTAN. A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY, AND RESIDUAL HOSTILITY TO THE SOVIETS MAY EVENTUALLY BE MATCHED BY THE RETURN OF HISTORICAL SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE WEST. PERHAPS THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN IS NOT SO MUCH WHAT HAS BEEN GAINED, BUT WHAT HAS BEEN AVERTED.

CLEARLY, THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL ARE THE PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE NEAR TERM. BUT EFFORTS BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO EXERT INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ALSO RECEIVE OUR ATTENTION. IN THE LONGER TERM, WE WILL EXAMINE THE FUTURE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY AND RESETTLE THE WORLD'S LARGEST REFUGEE POPULATION -- MORE THAN FIVE MILLION PEOPLE.

ABOUT THREE MILLION OF THOSE REFUGEES NOW LIVE IN PAKISTAN, A COUNTRY THAT HAS FULLY SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. PAKISTAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF STRATEGIC INTEREST TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS, BUT THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT ZIA IN AUGUST HAS RAISED NEW ISSUES.⁷

THE RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT ZIA'S DEATH HAS BEEN A SMOOTH, CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION. GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN ((GOO LOM ISH OCK CON)), THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, HAS TAKEN OVER AS ACTING PRESIDENT. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, A NEW PRESIDENT MUST

BE ELECTED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.
PRESIDENT ISHAQ HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE ELECTIONS SET FOR
NOVEMBER 16TH WILL BE HELD ON SCHEDULE. A SERIES OF JUDICIAL
RULINGS HAVE REMOVED THE CONSTRAINTS PLACED ON PAKISTAN'S
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1985 ELECTIONS, AND THE NOVEMBER
ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE MOST CLOSELY CONTESTED IN PAKISTAN'S
HISTORY.⁸

BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND PAKISTAN AND BECAUSE OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE,
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE FOLLOWING THESE
DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE KEENEST INTEREST.

ANOTHER REGION OF GREAT STRATEGIC INTEREST FOR THE UNITED
STATES IS THE PERSIAN GULF -- AN AREA WHERE TENSIONS REMAIN
HIGH DESPITE THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.⁹ NOT
SURPRISINGLY, THE PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS HAVE BEEN
FITFUL AND DIFFICULT. THE ANIMOSITIES BUILT UP OVER EIGHT
YEARS OF BITTER CONFLICT ARE NOT EASY TO DISPEL.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR COST THE TWO COUNTRIES MORE THAN 350 BILLION DOLLARS, AND EVEN MORE IN HUMAN COSTS -- MORE THAN ONE MILLION CASUALTIES AND ONE AND A HALF MILLION REFUGEES. THIS WAR WAS ONE OF THE BLOODIEST OF THE CENTURY, AND IT WILL TAKE MANY YEARS FOR THE TWO NATIONS TO RECOVER.

THE CONFLICT HAS AFFECTED NEARLY EVERY ASPECT OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN IRAN AND IRAQ. BOTH ECONOMIES HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY THE LOSS OF OIL REVENUES AND BOTH HAVE BORNE THE EXPENSE OF LARGE-SCALE ARMS PURCHASES. THE COSTS OF RECONSTRUCTION WILL BE A FURTHER DRAIN. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE EXHAUSTED THEIR FINANCIAL RESERVES AND HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO CUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

WE BELIEVE THESE COSTS OF THE WAR WILL DETER BOTH SIDES FROM RESUMING AN ALL-OUT CONFLICT ANYTIME SOON. HOWEVER, IRAN AND IRAQ CONTINUE TO DISTRUST EACH OTHER, AND BOTH WILL PROBABLY MAINTAIN THEIR MILITARY READINESS.

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, PROVIDING ASSESSMENTS OF THE INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES, AS WELL AS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE GULF WAS INCREASED, WE BEGAN PROVIDING DAILY TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NAVAL FORCES OPERATING WITH THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND. OUR SUPPORT INCLUDED REPORTS ON IRANIAN ANTISHIP CRUISE MISSILE SITES, NAVAL BASES, AIRFIELDS, AND COASTAL DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS. AS A RESULT, U.S. FORCES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY CARRY OUT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND PROTECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

THE END OF THE GULF WAR HAS CREATED A WHOLE NEW SET OF INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS WHICH WE ARE NOW ADDRESSING -- QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHAT EFFECT THE CEASE-FIRE MAY HAVE ON THE WESTERN HOSTAGES BEING HELD IN LEBANON; HOW THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN TEHRAN TO SUCCEED KHOMEINI WILL BE AFFECTED; WHAT IMPACT THE CEASE-FIRE WILL HAVE ON EACH COUNTRY'S DRIVE FOR REGIONAL

INFLUENCE; AND THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE COST OF OIL.

PERHAPS THE BIGGEST QUESTION WE ARE CONSIDERING IS WHAT LESSONS IRAN AND IRAQ -- AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- HAVE LEARNED FROM A WAR THAT INVOLVED THE FIRST SUSTAINED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SINCE WORLD WAR I.¹⁰

AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS OUTLAWED BY SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. DURING WORLD WAR II -- EVEN DURING THE MOST DESPERATE BATTLES -- BOTH SIDES REFRAINED FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- WEAPONS THAT WINSTON CHURCHILL REFERRED TO AS "THAT HELLISH POISON."

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENDED THAT RESTRAINT AND SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE WARS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN AND ALSO AGAINST IRAQI KURDS. IRAN, TOO, HAS EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS.¹¹

I'M SURE YOU'VE READ MANY ACCOUNTS RECENTLY ABOUT THE USE OF AND THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS ARE THOUGHT TO OFFER A CHEAP AND READILY OBTAINABLE MEANS OF REDRESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE AGAINST MORE POWERFUL FOES. SOME SEE THEM AS THE POOR MAN'S ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MORE THAN 20 COUNTRIES MAY BE DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

MUSTARD GAS, A TERRIBLE WEAPON FIRST USED IN WORLD WAR I, IS ONE OF THE FAVORED CHEMICAL AGENTS FOR SEVERAL REASONS -- ITS RELATIVE EASE OF MANUFACTURE, ITS LONG LIFE IN STORAGE AND ON THE BATTLEFIELD, AND ITS ABILITY TO INCAPACITATE THOSE EXPOSED TO IT.

SOME COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING NERVE AGENTS. THESE AGENTS, THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE, CAN CAUSE DEATH IN MINUTES BY ATTACKING THE BRAIN AND NERVOUS SYSTEM. OTHER NATIONS MAY USE COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS SUCH AS CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE. CYANIDE PREVENTS THE BLOOD FROM CARRYING OXYGEN, WHILE PHOSGENE, WIDELY USED IN MAKING PLASTICS, CAN DESTROY THE LUNGS.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE ABILITY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND THEIR INCENTIVES FOR USING SUCH WEAPONS. AND WITH THE INCREASE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD, WE MUST BE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS BY THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO ARM THESE MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.

THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS AFFECTS THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN REGIONS SUCH AS SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR ISRAEL, THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AMONG THE ARAB STATES -- PRINCIPALLY IRAQ, LIBYA, AND SYRIA -- COULD SERIOUSLY ALTER THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER. THIS HAS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE MORAL BARRIER TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE HAS BEEN LIFTED. AT LEAST 10 COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO PRODUCE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND THIS PRESENTS US WITH ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE CONCERN.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IS ALSO VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- EFFORTS SUCH AS RESTRICTING THE EXPORT OF CERTAIN KEY CHEMICALS AND OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT, THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATES IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. AND ON SEPTEMBER 26TH, PRESIDENT REAGAN ADDRESSED THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE CALLED ON THE SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND OTHER CONCERNED NATIONS TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE TOGETHER TO REVERSE THE SERIOUS EROSION OF THIS TREATY.¹²

ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- NOW AND INTO THE NEXT DECADE. IT IS ALSO ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT TASKS, FOR THESE WEAPONS MAY WELL REPRESENT ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO WORLD PEACE IN THE COMING YEARS.

THE GREAT BRITISH WRITER AND CYNIC, SOMERSET MAUGHAM, ONCE NOTED, "IT IS BAD ENOUGH TO KNOW THE PAST; IT WOULD BE INTOLERABLE TO KNOW THE FUTURE." IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE JUST AS INTOLERABLE NOT TO BE PREPARED FOR THE FUTURE. REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION, UNREST IN AFGHANISTAN, AND TENSIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARE ISSUES THAT WILL BE WITH US INTO THE NEXT DECADE. ASSESSING THESE QUESTIONS AND THEIR FAR-REACHING EFFECTS IS THE CRITICAL TASK OF INTELLIGENCE.

OUR MACHINES, OUR SYSTEMS, AND OUR SATELLITES ARE THE WONDERS OF THE AGE. THEY HELP US TO DO OUR VERY DIFFICULT WORK. BUT INTELLIGENCE IS PREEMINENTLY AN AFFAIR OF PEOPLE. IT IS THE CALIBER OF THE MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE -- THEIR CREATIVITY, DETERMINATION, BRILLIANCE, AND COURAGE -- THAT SPELLS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

I HOPE THAT WE CONTINUE TO ATTRACT THOSE BEST SUITED TO CARRY OUT OUR MISSION -- PEOPLE WHO ARE RISK TAKERS, BUT NOT

RISK SEEKERS. PEOPLE WHO ARE DEDICATED AND RESPONSIVE TO OUR LAW AND DISCIPLINE. PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND AND PLAY BY THE RULES. PEOPLE TO WHOM FAME AND FORTUNE ARE NOT A NECESSARY PART OF THEIR LIFE, BUT WHO CAN FIND IN THIS DIFFICULT WORK AN AVENUE TO PURSUE THEIR HIGHEST ASPIRATIONS FOR A SAFER AND BETTER WORLD.

WITH SUCH PEOPLE, WE CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE THAT POLICYMAKERS NEED IN ORDER TO MAKE WISE DECISIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS WHAT YOU EXPECT OF US, WHAT ALL AMERICANS EXPECT OF US, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU WE ARE DOING OUR VERY BEST TO SUPPLY IT.

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24 October 1988

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs Office

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Address of the World Affairs Council
of Washington, D.C.

1. This is background information for your address of the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. on Tuesday, 25 October. The meeting will be held at the Capital Hilton on 16th and K Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. Phone: 393-1000. Bill Devine will accompany you and remain throughout the program.

2. Arrangements: You are requested to be at the Presidential Ballroom at approximately 5:45 p.m. where you will be met by Chairman of the World Affairs Council Philip Odeen. (See tab opposite for a biography.) A short reception precedes the program. At approximately 5:55 p.m. you will be escorted by Mr. Odeen to the platform. Your remarks on "Intelligence: Key Issues for the 1990's" are scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m. and Mr. Odeen will introduce you and remain on stage throughout the program. The suggested format is 20 - 30 minutes of remarks followed by 30 minutes of questions and answers which will be moderated by Mr. Odeen. Questions will be submitted in written form. Adjournment is at 7:00 p.m. A podium and microphone will be available. DCI Security will tape your remarks for the Agency's historical files. A still photographer from the World Affairs Council will take photographs of you and Mr. Odeen on the dais.

3. Audience: You can expect an audience of approximately 600 - 700 professional men and women, representatives from international trade firms, retired CIA and Foreign Service officers, Treasury and Commerce officials, and members of the financial community. Since representatives from the embassies in the Washington area are members of the Council, you can expect foreign nationals to be in the audience. (See list opposite of diplomats who have registered.)

4. Media: Although the Council will not have a complete list of the media who will be present until immediately prior to program time, the Council believes that C-Span, AP, and VOICE OF AMERICA will tape your address. The press usually does not participate in the question and answer period.

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5. Background: The World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. founded in 1980 is a non-partisan, non-profit, public service organization. All World Affairs Council groups located in cities throughout the country are independent of each other in terms of membership and their programs. The World Affairs Council is dedicated to fostering greater interest in international issues by offering a public platform to foreign and US leaders and policy experts. (See tab opposite for background material.) As FBI Director, you addressed World Affairs Councils of California and Pittsburgh and in September you spoke to the Council in San Francisco.

Previous speakers have been Admiral Stansfield Turner and William Colby. The latter spoke on "The Role of CIA in Foreign Policy." This fall the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and the South Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Choi Kwang Soo spoke to the council. President of Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Janez Stanovnik will speak to the group in November. (See tab opposite for program calendar.)

S/ERS

William M. Baker

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19 October 1988

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JUDGE:

You are scheduled to address the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. on 25 October. We anticipate an audience of about 600 area leaders, and your remarks will be followed by a question-and-answer period.

We have based this speech on the one you delivered to the World Affairs Council of Northern California in September. The intelligence issues you discussed then -- the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, chemical weapons, and counterintelligence -- are still very much in the news, and they illustrate the breadth and complexity of our work.

We have updated the speech to reflect developments since it was first delivered on 19 September -- the recent personnel changes in the Soviet Union, the judicial rulings on the November elections in Pakistan, the fitful progress of the Iran-Iraq peace talks, further Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, and the President's call for an international conference on chemical weapons use. We obtained the information to update this speech from the DI's Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and Office of Scientific and Weapons Research. This speech has been coordinated with those offices, with the DI's Office of Soviet Analysis, and with the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Your proposed remarks are attached.

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Bill Baker

Attachments:
As Stated

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PROPOSED REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1988

IT IS THE FALL OF 1988 -- WE EDGE TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR AND THE END OF THE DECADE. I HAVE BEEN ASKED RATHER FREQUENTLY IN RECENT MONTHS TO REFLECT ON WHAT THE MOST IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE ISSUES OF THE 1990s WILL BE. THE QUESTION REMINDS ME OF AN OBSERVATION ONCE MADE BY A NUCLEAR PHYSICIST: "PREDICTION IS VERY DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE."¹ WITH THAT CAUTIONARY NOTE IN MIND, I WILL MAKE A FEW PREDICTIONS ABOUT SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES THAT NOW CONFRONT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- ISSUES THAT WE EXPECT TO BE WITH US WELL INTO THE NEXT DECADE.

MY GOOD FRIEND, GENERAL VERNON WALTERS, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NOW OUR AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DESCRIBES A VIEW HELD BY MANY IN THIS COUNTRY ABOUT INTELLIGENCE. "AMERICANS," HE SAID, "HAVE ALWAYS HAD AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THEY FEEL THREATENED, THEY WANT A LOT OF IT, AND WHEN THEY DON'T, THEY TEND TO REGARD THE WHOLE THING AS SOMEWHAT IMMORAL."

WITH SO MUCH GOING ON AROUND THE WORLD THAT AFFECTS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TODAY WANT A LOT OF INTELLIGENCE. AND A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES ARE COMMANDING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ATTENTION -- INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING, THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS, THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET BLOC-- TO NAME JUST A FEW INTELLIGENCE ISSUES THAT ARE GLOBAL IN NATURE.

THIS EVENING, I WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THREE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS THAT ARE -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- OF GREAT INTEREST TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND, THUS, OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THESE AREAS ARE THE SOVIET UNION, SOUTH ASIA, AND THE PERSIAN GULF. AND I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS TWO ISSUES THAT ARE TIED TO THESE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS -- THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND OUR CONTINUING NEED FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

THE SOVIET UNION WILL REMAIN THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS IN THE 1990s. ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY, ITS EFFORTS TO INCREASE GLOBAL INFLUENCE, AND ITS

AGGRESSIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE A SERIOUS THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS.²

GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS TO REFORM HIS COUNTRY HAVE NOT FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THESE TRUTHS AND, IN FACT, MAKE THE SOVIET UNION OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE.

THE PRESIDENT TOLD ME AN INTERESTING STORY RECENTLY. GORBACHEV SENT A REPRESENTATIVE OUT INTO ONE OF THE UKRAINIAN STATES TO SEE HOW PERESTROIKA WAS GETTING ALONG. HE WENT TO ONE OF THE SMALL VILLAGES AND ASKED TO SEE THE MAYOR. AFTER TALKING TO THE MAYOR FOR A MOMENT, HE SAID, "DO YOU HAVE ANY TELEVISION SETS IN THIS VILLAGE?" THE MAYOR LOOKED AT HIM AND SAID, "OF COURSE WE HAVE TELEVISION SETS. IN FACT, THERE MAY BE TWO TELEVISION SETS IN MANY OF THESE HUTS." THE REPRESENTATIVE SAID, "THAT IS VERY INTERESTING. WHAT ABOUT REFRIGERATORS?" AND THE MAYOR SAID, "OF COURSE. WE ALL HAVE REFRIGERATORS." THE REPRESENTATIVE LOOKED THE MAYOR IN THE EYE AND SAID, "DO YOU KNOW WHO I AM?" AND THE MAYOR SAID, "OF COURSE I DO. WHO ELSE BUT A CIA AGENT WOULD COME INTO A VILLAGE WITH NO ELECTRICITY AND ASK QUESTIONS LIKE THAT?"

LIKE MANY OF YOU, I HAVE BEEN FASCINATED BY WHAT IS OCCURRING IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV HAS STIRRED UP THE STEW -- BRINGING NEW LIFE AND DYNAMISM TO SOVIET POLITICS AND PUSHING A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT NONE OF US COULD HAVE FORESEEN FIVE YEARS AGO.

THE FORCES OF DEMOCRACY ARE MAKING SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INROADS. ALTHOUGH THE USSR CERTAINLY IS NOT HEADED TOWARD DEMOCRACY AS WE KNOW IT, TODAY'S SOVIET LEADERS APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR SYSTEM IS FALTERING LARGELY BECAUSE IT HAS NOT GIVEN THE PEOPLE ENOUGH BREATHING ROOM -- ROOM TO INNOVATE, ROOM TO INQUIRE, ROOM TO INVESTIGATE.

CHANGE IS OCCURRING IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL. THE SOVIETS ARE LEAVING AFGHANISTAN AND ELIMINATING A WHOLE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE INF TREATY -- A PROCESS THAT INCLUDES UNPRECEDENTED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY FACILITIES.

THE DRAMATIC NATURE OF THESE POLICY CHANGES CLEARLY HAS PROVOKED CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. A MAJOR POWER STRUGGLE IS UNDER WAY BETWEEN REFORMERS, WHO BELIEVE RADICAL CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM WORK, AND CONSERVATIVES, WHO

FEAR SUCH CHANGES COULD DESTABILIZE THE VERY SYSTEM THEY ARE TRYING TO SAVE. THE OUTCOME OF THIS STRUGGLE WILL AFFECT HOW FAR AND HOW FAST REFORM PROGRESSES, THE EXTENT TO WHICH CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS RELAXED, THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE INDIVIDUAL, AND HOW COMPETITIVE THE SOVIET SYSTEM WILL BE OVER THE NEXT FEW DECADES.

JUST ABOUT A MONTH AGO, GORBACHEV SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY -- UNDERTAKING THE MOST SWEEPING OVERHAUL OF THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIP SINCE KHRUSHCHEV OUSTED HIS CHIEF OPPONENTS IN 1957.³ THE CHANGES MADE SHOULD ALLOW GORBACHEV TO PUSH HIS POLICY AGENDA AT HOME AND ABROAD WITH RENEWED MOMENTUM.⁴

YET THIS IS ONLY ONE VICTORY IN A VERY LONG WAR TO REFORM THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THE PROCESS WILL BE LONG AND DRAWN OUT AT BEST, REQUIRING GORBACHEV TO OVERCOME ENORMOUS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES.

THERE ARE STRONG REASONS TO DOUBT WHETHER A SYSTEM DESIGNED TO CENTRALIZE AUTHORITY, MAXIMIZE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER ITS PEOPLE, AND CONCENTRATE RESOURCES ON BUILDING UP THE NATION'S MILITARY

STRENGTH CAN BECOME MORE DECENTRALIZED AND DEMOCRATIC IN ITS
DECISIONMAKING AND MORE SOLICITOUS OF ITS PEOPLE. THE NATIONALIST
UNREST IN THE BALTIC STATES, ARMENIA, AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE USSR
WILL TEST THE SOVIET SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO MAKE REFORMS WORK.

BUT IF THE LAST THREE YEARS HAVE TAUGHT US ANYTHING, IT IS THAT
GORBACHEV IS A HIGHLY SKILLED POLITICIAN, AND WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT HE CAN, ULTIMATELY, PULL OFF A "REVOLUTION FROM
ABOVE" THAT ACTUALLY INCREASES AUTHORITY BELOW.

THE SOVIET REFORM EFFORT PRESENTS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WITH SOME FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES. WE MUST PAY CLOSER
ATTENTION THAN EVER TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND ISSUES BEING
RAISED AS GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE THE ESTABLISHED INTERESTS
OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS.

WE MUST ALSO HELP THE POLICYMAKER SORT OUT HOW REFORM WILL
AFFECT SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES AND -- EVEN MORE
DIFFICULT -- HOW IT MAY CHANGE MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY.

WE MUST MANAGE THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION THAT GLASNOST HAS
PRODUCED WHICH, THOUGH WELCOME, CHALLENGES US TO SORT OUT WHAT IS

IMPORTANT AND WHAT IS NOT, WHAT IS REAL VERSUS WHAT MOSCOW WANTS US TO HEAR.

WE MUST SUPPORT U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS. AS THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE INCREASINGLY ASKED TO ASSESS SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS. AND THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT REQUIRED IS TREMENDOUS. THE INF TREATY HAS REQUIRED THE UNITED STATES TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS AT 117 SOVIET FACILITIES. MONITORING THE START TREATY, WHICH IS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA, COULD INVOLVE AS MANY AS 2,500 WEAPONS LOCATIONS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION.⁵

YET WHATEVER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THE UNITED STATES MAKES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OUR RELATIONSHIP IS LIKELY TO REMAIN ADVERSARIAL. POLICYMAKERS WILL DEPEND ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO MAKE QUICK AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS -- AND EVEN TO ANTICIPATE GORBACHEV'S SOMETIMES UNORTHODOX AND UNEXPECTED INITIATIVES.

INTELLIGENCE ABOUT SOUTH ASIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT TO POLICYMAKERS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN DEMONSTRATES HIS DESIRE TO CUT SOVIET LOSSES IN ORDER TO PURSUE OTHER OBJECTIVES. BUT DESPITE THE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN A KEY FOREIGN POLICY CONCERN IN MOSCOW. BECAUSE OF THE SOVIETS' CONTINUED INTEREST AND ITS STRATEGIC LOCATION, AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN AN IMPORTANT CONCERN IN WASHINGTON AS WELL.⁶

WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW THE REST OF THEIR TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN BY FEBRUARY 15TH OF NEXT YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW WILL TRY TO RETAIN ITS INFLUENCE WITH KABUL THROUGH BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEANS. THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN SEVERAL WEEKS AGO INDICATES THAT AFGHANISTAN REMAINS A PRIORITY CONCERN IN MOSCOW.

FOLLOWING THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, WE BELIEVE THAT AFGHANISTAN WILL BE UNSTABLE FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD AND HAVE SO ADVISED POLICYMAKERS. THE SOVIET-BACKED REGIME HAS MINIMAL CONTROL OR SUPPORT OUTSIDE KABUL, AND THE WITHDRAWAL WILL MAKE ITS POSITION EVEN MORE PRECARIOUS. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL CONTINUE ITS

EFFORTS TO DESTROY WHAT IS LEFT OF THE REGIME. HOWEVER, THE RULING PARTY'S FRAGMENTATION MAY BE AS LARGE A FACTOR IN THE REGIME'S COLLAPSE AS THE MILITARY INITIATIVES OF THE RESISTANCE.

THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD WILL ALSO FIND THE AFGHAN REBELS FIGHTING AMONG THEMSELVES -- AS THEY DID THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET OCCUPATION -- FOR POLITICAL POWER IN AFGHANISTAN. GIVEN THAT MOST ETHNIC GROUPS ARE BETTER ARMED THAN EVER BEFORE AND ARE LIKELY TO CAPTURE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS FROM THE DISINTEGRATING AFGHAN ARMY, WE COULD EXPECT TO SEE TRIBAL CONFLICT CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

THE FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL ENTER THE POST-SOVIET ERA WELL-ARMED AND WELL-ORGANIZED. WHATEVER THE COMPOSITION OF A FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, ISLAMIC RITUAL AND LAW WILL PROBABLY PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN ITS OPERATIONS AND POLICIES. BUT THE NATURE AND TRADITIONS OF AFGHANISTAN MAKE THE IMPOSITION OF A KHOMEINI-STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM UNLIKELY.

THE UNITED STATES CANNOT DICTATE WHO WILL FINALLY EMERGE AS THE LEADERS IN AFGHANISTAN. A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY.

AND RESIDUAL HOSTILITY TO THE SOVIETS MAY EVENTUALLY BE MATCHED BY THE RETURN OF HISTORICAL SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE WEST. PERHAPS THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN IS NOT SO MUCH WHAT HAS BEEN GAINED, BUT WHAT HAS BEEN AVERTED.

CLEARLY, THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL ARE THE PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE NEAR TERM. BUT EFFORTS BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO EXERT INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ALSO RECEIVE OUR ATTENTION. IN THE LONGER TERM, WE WILL EXAMINE THE FUTURE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY AND RESETTLE THE WORLD'S LARGEST REFUGEE POPULATION -- MORE THAN FIVE MILLION PEOPLE.

ABOUT THREE MILLION OF THOSE REFUGEES NOW LIVE IN PAKISTAN, A COUNTRY THAT HAS FULLY SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. PAKISTAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF STRATEGIC INTEREST TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS, BUT THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT ZIA IN AUGUST HAS RAISED NEW ISSUES.⁷

THE RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT ZIA'S DEATH HAS BEEN A SMOOTH, CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION. GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN ((GOO LOM ISH OCK CON)), THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, HAS TAKEN OVER AS ACTING

PRESIDENT. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, A NEW PRESIDENT MUST BE ELECTED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT ISHAQ HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE ELECTIONS SET FOR NOVEMBER 16TH WILL BE HELD ON SCHEDULE. A SERIES OF JUDICIAL RULINGS HAVE REMOVED THE CONSTRAINTS PLACED ON PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1985 ELECTIONS, AND THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE MOST CLOSELY CONTESTED IN PAKISTAN'S HISTORY.⁸

BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN AND BECAUSE OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE FOLLOWING THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE KEENEST INTEREST.

ANOTHER REGION OF GREAT STRATEGIC INTEREST FOR THE UNITED STATES IS THE PERSIAN GULF -- AN AREA WHERE TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH DESPITE THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.⁹ NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS HAVE BEEN FITFUL AND DIFFICULT. THE ANIMOSITIES BUILT UP OVER EIGHT YEARS OF BITTER CONFLICT ARE NOT EASY TO DISPEL.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR COST THE TWO COUNTRIES MORE THAN 350 BILLION DOLLARS, AND EVEN MORE IN HUMAN COSTS -- MORE THAN ONE MILLION CASUALTIES AND ONE AND A HALF MILLION REFUGEES. THIS WAR WAS ONE OF THE BLOODIEST OF THE CENTURY, AND IT WILL TAKE MANY YEARS FOR THE TWO NATIONS TO RECOVER.

THE CONFLICT HAS AFFECTED NEARLY EVERY ASPECT OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN IRAN AND IRAQ. BOTH ECONOMIES HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY THE LOSS OF OIL REVENUES AND BOTH HAVE BORNE THE EXPENSE OF LARGE-SCALE ARMS PURCHASES. THE COSTS OF RECONSTRUCTION WILL BE A FURTHER DRAIN. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE EXHAUSTED THEIR FINANCIAL RESERVES AND HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO CUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

WE BELIEVE THESE COSTS OF THE WAR WILL DETER BOTH SIDES FROM RESUMING AN ALL-OUT CONFLICT ANYTIME SOON. HOWEVER, IRAN AND IRAQ CONTINUE TO DISTRUST EACH OTHER, AND BOTH WILL PROBABLY MAINTAIN THEIR MILITARY READINESS.

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, PROVIDING ASSESSMENTS OF THE INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES, AS WELL AS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

REGION AND THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE GULF WAS INCREASED, WE BEGAN PROVIDING DAILY TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NAVAL FORCES OPERATING WITH THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND. OUR SUPPORT INCLUDED REPORTS ON IRANIAN ANTISHIP CRUISE MISSILE SITES, NAVAL BASES, AIRFIELDS, AND COASTAL DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS. AS A RESULT, U.S. FORCES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY CARRY OUT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND PROTECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

THE END OF THE GULF WAR HAS CREATED A WHOLE NEW SET OF INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS WHICH WE ARE NOW ADDRESSING -- QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHAT EFFECT THE CEASE-FIRE MAY HAVE ON THE WESTERN HOSTAGES BEING HELD IN LEBANON; HOW THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN TEHRAN TO SUCCEED KHOMEINI WILL BE AFFECTED; WHAT IMPACT THE CEASE-FIRE WILL HAVE ON EACH COUNTRY'S DRIVE FOR REGIONAL INFLUENCE; AND THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE COST OF OIL.

PERHAPS THE BIGGEST QUESTION WE ARE CONSIDERING IS WHAT LESSONS IRAN AND IRAQ -- AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- HAVE LEARNED FROM A WAR THAT INVOLVED THE FIRST SUSTAINED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SINCE WORLD WAR I.¹⁰

AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS OUTLAWED BY SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. DURING WORLD WAR II -- EVEN DURING THE MOST DESPERATE BATTLES -- BOTH SIDES REFRAINED FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- WEAPONS THAT WINSTON CHURCHILL REFERRED TO AS "THAT HELLISH POISON."

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENDED THAT RESTRAINT AND SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE WARS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN AND ALSO AGAINST IRAQI KURDS. IRAN, TOO, HAS EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS.¹¹

I'M SURE YOU'VE READ MANY ACCOUNTS RECENTLY ABOUT THE USE OF AND THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS ARE THOUGHT TO OFFER A CHEAP AND READILY OBTAINABLE MEANS OF REDRESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE AGAINST MORE POWERFUL FOES. SOME SEE THEM AS THE POOR MAN'S ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MORE THAN 20 COUNTRIES MAY BE DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

MUSTARD GAS, A TERRIBLE WEAPON FIRST USED IN WORLD WAR I, IS ONE OF THE FAVORED CHEMICAL AGENTS FOR SEVERAL REASONS -- ITS RELATIVE

EASE OF MANUFACTURE, ITS LONG LIFE IN STORAGE AND ON THE BATTLEFIELD, AND ITS ABILITY TO INCAPACITATE THOSE EXPOSED TO IT.

SOME COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING NERVE AGENTS. THESE AGENTS, THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE, CAN CAUSE DEATH IN MINUTES BY ATTACKING THE BRAIN AND NERVOUS SYSTEM. OTHER NATIONS MAY USE COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS SUCH AS CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE. CYANIDE PREVENTS THE BLOOD FROM CARRYING OXYGEN, WHILE PHOSGENE, WIDELY USED IN MAKING PLASTICS, CAN DESTROY THE LUNGS.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE ABILITY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND THEIR INCENTIVES FOR USING SUCH WEAPONS. AND WITH THE INCREASE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD, WE MUST BE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS BY THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO ARM THESE MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.

THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS AFFECTS THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN REGIONS SUCH AS SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR ISRAEL, THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AMONG THE ARAB STATES -- PRINCIPALLY IRAQ, LIBYA, AND SYRIA -- COULD SERIOUSLY

ALTER THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER. THIS HAS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE MORAL BARRIER TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE HAS BEEN LIFTED. AT LEAST 10 COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO PRODUCE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND THIS PRESENTS US WITH ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE CONCERN.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IS ALSO VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- EFFORTS SUCH AS RESTRICTING THE EXPORT OF CERTAIN KEY CHEMICALS AND OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT, THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATES IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. AND ON SEPTEMBER 26TH, PRESIDENT REAGAN ADDRESSED THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE CALLED ON THE SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND OTHER CONCERNED NATIONS TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE TOGETHER TO REVERSE THE SERIOUS EROSION OF THIS TREATY.¹²

ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- NOW AND INTO THE NEXT DECADE. IT IS ALSO ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT TASKS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE U.S. POLICYMAKERS WITH ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION ON THIS ISSUE.

ANOTHER MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS THE THREAT POSED BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. I WANT TO BRIEFLY MENTION THIS TODAY, IN LIGHT OF THE AUGUST ARREST IN WEST GERMANY OF FORMER ARMY SERGEANT CLYDE LEE CONRAD, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH PASSING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS TO THE SOVIET BLOC.¹³

THIS CASE REINFORCES THE FACT THAT AN EFFECTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM REQUIRES VIGILANCE ON BOTH THE DEFENSIVE AND THE OFFENSIVE FRONTS. FIRST, WE MUST PROTECT SENSITIVE INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT, AND PERSONNEL. SECOND, WE MUST DETECT, MONITOR, AND COUNTER THE ACTIONS OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. AS THE SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED, OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES MUST GROW CORRESPONDINGLY STRONGER.

THE CONRAD CASE ALSO POINTS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF TENACITY AND OF CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG THE VARIOUS AGENCIES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE FBI, THE CIA, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKED TOGETHER FOR OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION THAT RESULTED IN CONRAD'S ARREST. IN FACT, MOST COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES, INCLUDING THOSE THAT THE PUBLIC HEARS ABOUT, ARE THE RESULT OF YEARS OF CAREFUL WORK.

THE RANGE OF ISSUES CONFRONTING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN A WORLD OF RAPID CHANGE IS IMPRESSIVE. THE GREAT BRITISH WRITER AND CYNIC, SOMERSET MAUGHAM, ONCE NOTED, "IT IS BAD ENOUGH TO KNOW THE PAST; IT WOULD BE INTOLERABLE TO KNOW THE FUTURE." HE MAY BE RIGHT. BUT THE BUSINESS OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRES US BOTH TO ASSESS CURRENT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AND TO MAKE PREDICTIONS ABOUT FUTURE EVENTS THAT COULD AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS.

OUR MACHINES, OUR SYSTEMS, AND OUR SATELLITES ARE THE WONDERS OF THE AGE. THEY HELP US TO DO OUR VERY DIFFICULT WORK. BUT INTELLIGENCE IS PREEMINENTLY AN AFFAIR OF PEOPLE. IT IS THE CALIBER OF THE MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE -- THEIR CREATIVITY,

DETERMINATION, BRILLIANCE, AND COURAGE -- THAT SPELLS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

I HOPE THAT WE CONTINUE TO ATTRACT THOSE BEST SUITED TO CARRY OUT OUR MISSION -- PEOPLE WHO ARE RISK TAKERS, BUT NOT RISK SEEKERS. PEOPLE WHO ARE DEDICATED AND RESPONSIVE TO OUR LAW AND DISCIPLINE. PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND AND PLAY BY THE RULES. PEOPLE TO WHOM FAME AND FORTUNE ARE NOT A NECESSARY PART OF THEIR LIFE, BUT WHO CAN FIND IN THIS DIFFICULT WORK AN AVENUE TO PURSUE THEIR HIGHEST ASPIRATIONS FOR A SAFER AND BETTER WORLD.

WITH SUCH PEOPLE, WE CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE THAT POLICYMAKERS NEED IN ORDER TO MAKE WISE DECISIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS WHAT YOU EXPECT OF US, WHAT ALL AMERICANS EXPECT OF US, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU WE ARE DOING OUR VERY BEST TO SUPPLY IT.

William H. Webster, San Francisco September 1988, Questions & Answers

FBI related (CISPES, Counterintelligence, etc.)

While you were FBI Chief, the Bureau investigated a number of groups opposed to the Reagan administration, including a Massachusetts based political group known as "Jobs With Peace". Both Gov. Dukakis and Jesse Jackson on the advisory board of the group. Do the American people have anything to fear about their continuing involvement with the Peace organization; with Gov. Dukakis' involvement?

I'm just not familiar with that exact investigation at all.

The Center for Constitutional Rights is suing the FBI for violating civil liberties during an investigation. You were head of the FBI when the investigation started in 1981, were you connected with it and if so in what way?

I accept responsibility for anything that occurred during that investigation, but I had no personal knowledge of it. The reason is that the investigation used such low-level investigative techniques and such a little amount of manpower. It used about 5 man years per year for 2 years, 10 man years in total compared with dozens and dozens of man years against

right-wing terrorist organizations and other investigations that were going on during the terrorism program. It used no electronic surveillance, no undercover agents, and no court authorized searches that I'm aware of. In consequence, any of those things which would have required my approval didn't come to my attention. If you ask me about CISPES, what I think is important about the results of that investigation inspection report is that it proved that it was not the kind of investigation that many Americans feared it might be. It had no White House connections at all and was not politically motivated. It began because information from FBI sources--besides the source who turned out to be very sour--suggested a possible connection between CISPES and the FMLN--a violent, virulent terrorist organization in Central America. It was a legitimate investigation at the time when terrorism problems were a major concern to the United States and it involved minimum investigative techniques, minimum time, and no one was hurt that I am aware of. There were mistakes made in handling the investigation and they been identified and adjustments have been made at the Bureau to keep those sorts of things from happening again. There was also some ambiguity in the Attorney General's guidelines and the current FBI Director has asked that the Department of Justice give additional advice on those areas. The conclusions that was reached in that investigation was that no laws were violated and there no misuse of the information, it was not used to discredit anyone. I think that as I look back on my nine years at the Bureau not a single successful claim of a violation of a constitutional right was made and I am very proud of that and very confident that will be sustained in any lawsuit questioning violation of constitutional rights.

Would you say there were managerial flaws in the FBI under your direction, as Mr. Sessions testified?

There's never been an investigation of any kind that I have been familiar with where you couldn't do it better the next time. The important thing is whether the rules were respected, whether the laws were observed, and whether you could identify the mistakes after it was over and make sure that they weren't repeated. There was some looseness in the follow-up by the supervisory people at Hqs on the instructions that they had given to the field. They gave the right instructions; they gave instructions that were consistent with my policy. When they received the inquiries from a few field offices, New Orleans was one of them, which suggested that the people in the field were beginning to get interested in the policital views of those associated with CISPES, Hqs. should have told them immediately that that was wrong. Instead, they sent out again routine guidance to the field. Director Sessions has taken corrective action and he has also taken administrative action and I suppose if I had been there I would have taken similar administrative action if it were warranted. It is very difficult when you're running 170 to 200,000 investigations concurrently for them to be followed at the top as closely as we all like and it's very difficult to run that many and not have some administration mistakes and I don't want to minimize them, but I want to stress that the important thing is the FBI respects the law and there is not one shred of evidence on this investigation, the investigation of an investigation, that the laws were not respected.

Did you discuss with Oliver Buck Revell either the investigation into terrorists from El Salvador and the CISPES investigation? Were you aware of the CISPES investigation at the time it was ongoing?

Once the problems of CISPES came to light in the early months of 1987, I did alot of discussing with a lot of people. I do not think that Mr. Revell or myself were informed about CISPES. That's one of the problems that Director Sessions is taking steps to correct. I've found only one document that even mentioned the name CISPES during that whole time coming to me. I explained earlier it was such a low-level investigation that the mechanisms we had in place - with 170,000 investigations ongoing - were simply not triggered. There were no wire taps and no undercover operations. The Dept. of Justice was periodically reviewing it, but it was kept at a very low level.

The Center for Constitutional Rights says that there are over 1300 pages of documents that they have obtained from the Freedom of Information Act that showed that the FBI conducted what they refer to as illegal surveillance on over 150 groups in the U.S. that simply opposed administration policy in Central America, separate from CISPES. Do you have any knowledge of those investigations?

I did not and I think that misdescribes what happened. Those were spinoff investigations of the CISPES as we looked for leadership involvement with the FMLN, but the numbers are misstated. I think the final figures that were given to the Congressional hearing yesterday was there was some 9 organizations - maybe 150 individuals - but only 9 organizations. I don't know the reasons why they were investigated, I haven't seen the file, but I come back to what I mentioned earlier. When you have five man-years a year for two years, that's like five people working full-time for one year one a case; you can't be that pervasive with a major activity.

Under the Reagan administration the DCI and I think National Security Advisor have the power to task the FBI to undertake certain jobs. Could you tell us how many times that happened during your tenure as FBI Chief and did you ever have any problems with anything you were ever asked to do?

I can't give you a number and I can't recall any time when I had a problem. Usually the requests originated with one of the agencies in the Community that the DCI headed. The National Security Agency might request that a certain action be taken to collect a certain kind of information and it went through the DCI and then would come to the FBI to make the installation. The FBI was governed in every respect on electronic

surveillance by court orders and not by the DCI, so the probable cause had to be taken to a federal judge and approved by the Attorney General. We all looked at these things closely. I can remember one or two positive collection efforts - counterintelligence - that I asked many questions about, sat down with my general counsel and assured myself that it was entirely proper.

Can you give a ballpark figures for how many warrantless searches were done while you were FBI Director?

I don't believe there were more than a dozen and probably less than that. As you know that is covered under the President's inherent power. We tried under then Attorney General Sivelletti to see if the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court would issue search warrants and they said they were not authorized. So it was back to the original authority of the President and again the Attorney General signed off on it and all the principal players had to view it and I had to sign it.

Why was the Decision for Social Responsibility investigated- it was a 62 categorization, administrative matter.

I can't tell you. I haven't seen the file.

Management at CIA

What distinguishes the Agency under your direction compared with that of the Casey years?

I'm trying to build on much of the progress that has been made. As a result of the Iran-Contra events certain needs were identified that I'm trying to put in place. One of those is to improve the confidence of the public and our oversight authorities in the Congress and the policy makers in the Executive Branch of the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence product, that is that we do not cook the books. There's a little difference in style. I thought that was so important that I asked the President to allow me to step back from a Cabinet position so that I would not be identified with the political policy-making process. I've done some other things in relation to testifying to Congress. We appear about a thousand times a year before the Congress and I'm very careful now to be sure that on those sensitive areas where we're talking about a classified matter, that if the briefers are not sure about what they can say that they simply say they are not authorized to answer the question. The matter will then be worked out between the Congress and me, and on occasion I will take the heat with the Congress for not wanting to answer questions.

Under your leadership, what is CIA policy on using journalists as cover?

My understanding is that we do not recruit journalists as cover, but if journalists want to supply us information out of the sense of obligation as citizens of this country we'll take it but we will not make assets or informants out of journalists.

Counterintelligence

Are all the spy scandals ranging from Edward Lee Howard to the Walker family the result of lax security on the part of the United States Government? Who should take the blame for all those scandals?

It is important for us to do a better job in what we call countermeasures as well as counterintelligence. There has been some sloppiness in our attitude of protecting our nation's secrets. The clandestine intelligence efforts directed against the United States, particularly by the Soviets and the Soviet Bloc countries has never been higher and I've totally reorganized the counterintelligence efforts of the CIA to do a better job. Those who have embassy responsibilities are also going to have to do a much better job of protecting our security because we are dealing with a different kind of world than at the end of World War II when those who betrayed this country were doing so for ideological reasons-- they believed in communism and what it offered the world. We deal now with spies who sell out for money, or revenge.

On the note of loose security, since American diplomats were onboard the plane with President Zia of Pakistan, should the American embassy in Pakistan have provided additional security along with Pakistani security?

I don't think we would find that kind of looseness in security at the American Embassy. We don't know the real cause of that crash at the present time. You can always look back and see flaws in security efforts; and I know that those who were involved in planning that security would feel very badly, if in fact, it was sabotage and not an accident through maintenance or pilot error.

Have you made recommendations to Secretary of State Shultz as to whether the American Embassy in Moscow should be torn down?

Sec. Shultz commissioned an outside study which has completed its report. Whether we take it to the ground or whether we take it down several floors and do some slicing and other techniques and try to rebuild it, it's going to be a major investment for us. But we are learning alot. A good part of that building has come home for examination and exploitation. The focus has been on the embarrassment of the embassy in Moscow, but just as much damage can be done in other embassies in other parts of the world where the ability to penetrate is easier and where security is more lax. And for

that reason we have been working to develop new standards of security. The Sec. of State and I have some competing interests, but the charge is to make it secure and I regard that as a heavy responsibility, not only for the Secretary of State but for the Director of Central Intelligence because we have substantial equities there as well.

What kinds of things did we learn in taking apart that embassy? Did we learn anything about their intelligence techniques that we didn't know before?

Yes, we did. We learned a number of intelligence techniques that I can't discuss in this kind of a forum, but it puts us in a much better position to be sure that that sort of thing doesn't happen in the future and can guard against it in a more general way across the board in our embassies elsewhere.

Why is the CIA still classifying "Secret" national security information documents relating to a past surveillance and infiltration operation?

I can't answer the question because I'm really not familiar with the particular investigations you're talking about. I can tell you in general that classification should be limited to the protection of sources and methods. If there are sources who are still alive who could be adversely affected, if there are methods which are still being used in any other part of the world, there is a tendency on our part to protect it. The Freedom of Information Act is there, if we are abusing that privilege the Freedom of Information Act is there to protect our citizens.

That begs the question does the CIA still have operations involving U.S. based publications, either as intelligence gathering operations inside radical publications for example or using their offices abroad . . .

No.

Briefing of Vice President

Have you consulted with V.P. Bush on intelligence matters and if the Vice President wins this election do you expect to remain in your post?

I serve at the pleasure of the President. I've considered myself on loan to my Government for 18 years and when I'm not needed I'm fully prepared to reenter private life. As far as advising the Vice President, he can attend all my meetings and briefings with the President as well as the National Security Council and he frequently does so. He has access to the

same briefing materials that are provided to the President each morning and frequently asks for additional information which is given to him. I have provided Gov. Dukakis and Sen. Bentsen with an overall assessment of our national intelligence situation around the world and have left with them an invitation to provide any additional briefings that they might require.

Foreign Policy

Given that the Government of Nicaragua was elected by the people in 1984 by a rather large majority, don't you think it defeats our purposes in trying to help democracy grow in foreign countries to support organizations or groups like the Contras?

The Central Intelligence Agency, under my direction, is not interested in setting policy, that's not our job. When we assist State Dept. or the National Security Council, whether by covert action or by intelligence collection, it is in furtherance of the foreign policy of this country, not CIA policy. I can give you the reasons why Nicaragua represents a threat to our national security but I don't want to make an argument for policy. The Nicaraguan Government depends in large measure for support upon Marxist countries, Cuba and the Soviets. They have been ruthless in putting down freedom of expression, closed radio stations, closed newspapers, and have disregarded the Arias peace commitments and to that extent they represent an activity that is hostile to the overall foreign policy of this country - which is to promote democratic institutions everywhere in Central and South America - our national security is affected.

But don't you think that conditions have dramatically improved since the Sandinistas have taken power compared with the Samosa years?

Many ruthless things were done under Samosa and the foreign policy of this country was to see him removed. The people of Nicaragua are not enjoying a better quality of life under the Sandinistas - their inflation is up in the 1500% area. They should have freedom to determine their own form of government, but they have denied that expression to the opposition inside Nicaragua. It was only when the Contras represented a serious military presence inside Nicaragua, 15,000 strong, that Nicaragua came to the peace table. Now that the Contras are weaker, the Sandinistas are poised to crush the remaining resistance and are ignoring their commitments under the Arias peace plan. I sound like I'm getting dangerously close to making foreign policy arguments and I don't want to do that. I'm simply saying how I find Nicaragua today.

Would you like to comment on the current situation in Pakistan with the November election coming up?

I think the election is going to be a very close one. I think Mrs. Bhutto has an opportunity to prevail for a lot of reasons having to do with some dissention inside the government in power. I have no reason to believe the elections on Nov. 16 will not take place. I can't guarantee whether they are going to be fair or not. But I believe that as long as Bhutto does not attack the military, it will not interfere with the election and would accept her if she were elected. If she and her party take on the military, then we have a different potential for the future.

What's the American assessment of Gen. Mirza Beg?

I don't think I should be publicly assessing the military or political leaders of countries with whom we have a warm relationship. He is an experienced military officer, he was Vice Chief of Staff at the time of the death of the Chief of Staff, General Akhtar. He is allowing the parliamentary elections to take place, and the only reservation that I sense is that it must be orderly.

PAO 88-0106

22 March 1988

JUDGE:

RE: Speaking Invitation
 World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
 Capitol Hilton Hotel
 Washington, D.C.
 Convenient date 1988

You have agreed to address the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. at some convenient date. (See memo opposite.) Since your schedule is tight for the remaining spring months and many people are on vacation in the summer, I propose you speak to the Council sometime in September or October. If you agree, I will have a member of my staff schedule a mutually agreeable date.

STAT

 Bill Baker

Agree to set a date in September: _____

Agree to set a date in October: _____

Disagree: _____

STAT

But not 1. must have agenda

STAT
 STAT



ADMINISTRATIVE

DCI/WMB/

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee
 1 - DDCI
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Speaking Invitation - World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.

FROM:

William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs

EXTENSION

27676

NO.

PAO 87-0164

DATE

1 December 1987

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

1.

ER

2 DEC 1987

2.

3.

DCI

3 Dec. 12/10

Answer

4.

5.

PAO

6.

7.

8.

9.

[Bul check date with me]

PAO

See DCI comment on date.

ES

DCI
EXEC
REG

PAO 87-0164

1 December 1987

JUDGE:

RE: Speaking Invitation
World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
Capitol Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.
Convenient Date

Chairman of the World Affairs Council Philip Odeen has invited you to speak to the Council on some convenient date. You are asked to choose from two proposed formats. The first is an evening meeting for the general membership from 5:30 - 7:00 p.m. Beginning with a brief reception, a program of 20 minutes of remarks on a topic of your choice and 30 minutes of questions and answers would follow. You could expect an audience of approximately 600 area leaders. C-Span usually covers the event. The other alternative is an off-the-record luncheon for 40-60 corporate supporters who represent defense related corporations.

Previous speakers have been Admiral Stansfield Turner and William Colby who spoke on "The Role of CIA in Foreign Policy" last March. Recently Alexander Haig and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Gaston Sigur, spoke to the group. As FBI Director, you have addressed both the World Affairs Council of California and Pittsburgh.

In your role as Director of Central Intelligence, I believe that the World Affairs Council is an appropriate group for you to address. In order to reach the largest audience, I recommend that you choose the evening meeting with an audience of 600. If you agree, attached is an interim letter of acceptance for your signature.

STAT

STAT DCI/PAO/WMB



Bill Baker

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

1 - DDCI

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Washington, D.C. 20505

16 DEC 1987

Mr. Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
1800 M Street, N.W. Suite 295
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Odeen:

Thank you for the invitation to speak to the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. at some convenient date. I am pleased to accept the honor and look forward to meeting with your membership at one of your evening meetings. A member of my Public Affairs staff will be in touch with you concerning the arrangements.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William H. Webster

William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence



WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

1800 M Street, N.W. • Suite 295 • Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 293-1051

EXECUTIVE Registry

87-3487X

October 20, 1987

The Honorable
William G. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

As chairman of The World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C., I am writing to extend an invitation to you to address our membership at a time convenient to your schedule. We would be honored to host a program featuring you as Guest Speaker at the earliest opportunity.

The World Affairs Council is a non-partisan, non-position-taking organization, dedicated to fostering greater interest in international issues through offering a public platform to foreign and U.S. leaders and policy experts.

Traditionally our programs for the general membership are held in the early evening timeframe (5:30-7:00 p.m.) and include a brief reception, formal address, and question/answer period, with questions submitted in writing by the audience. A luncheon meeting is also possible, if that is your preference. Our events are held in one of the major hotels, with several hundred members attending.

Alternatively, we also have a Corporate Forum for executives of companies that support the Council, for which we schedule off-the-record sessions either as luncheons or early evening meetings. These smaller, private sessions involve 40-60 of our business supporters.

I do hope you might agree to address the Council and I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
(office: 822-4294)

Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
Patrick W. Gross
Vice Chairman
Lois Haase Mares
Secretary
Henry A. Dudley, Jr.
Treasurer
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Mrs. George P. Shultz

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1	DCI		X		
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3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
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22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

26 Oct '87

Date

3637 (10-81)


WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

1800 M Street, N.W. • Suite 295 • Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 293-1051

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P-309-1R